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Disabled Under Tort Law
Sarah Light
"A psychiatrist of long and fruitful experience once remarked that
the chief difference between the normal man and the one who was
mentally sick, was that the latter was inside the walls of a hospital
and the former was not."'
Contemporary tort law articulates a norm in favor of confinement for
the mentally disabled.2 It encourages their institutionalization and
discourages their reintegration into the community This Note argues that a
1. Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53
YALE LJ. 271, 271 (1944) (quoting EDWARD A. STRECKER & FRANKLIN G. EBAUGH.
PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 20 (4th ed. 1935)).
2. Courts and commentators have referred to those with mental disabilities in different ways
over time. In order to avoid confusion, this Note adopts the term "mentally disabled" to refer to
anyone who is either "mentally ill" or "mentally retarded." One who is mentally ill suffers from
either emotional disturbance or psychosis. Courts formerly referred to such people as -insane" or
"lunatics." See, e.g., Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (L-B. 1616). Mental retardation suggests
diminished mental capacity, and in the past courts have used the terms "imbeciles" or "idiots" to
characterize such people. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). The term "mentally
incompetent" refers to that subset of people with mental disabilities who lack the capacity to
control or appreciate the consequences of their actions. "Mentally incompetent" is a doctrinal
conclusion rather than a prior category. See generally ROBERT M. LEvY & LEONARD S.
RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABnLrIES 9-13 (1996).
3. The concepts of the "community" and "confinement," or "institutionalization." are
loaded and are hardly discrete and dichotomous categories. There exists a continuum of care
settings, from the most restrictive institutions and nursing homes (what Erring Goffman would
call "total institutions"); to intermediate arrangements such as group homes or community
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rationale for holding mentally disabled individuals liable for their torts that
relies upon a preference for confinement is misplaced, because it creates an
incentive to confine a mentally disabled individual even when this might
not be in the individual's best interest. Regardless of economic incentives,
however, reliance upon a confinement rationale reflects an outmoded
understanding of the proper place of the mentally disabled in contemporary
American society. This rationale should be reconsidered by courts,
commentators, and advocates. American civil rights law has shifted
radically in its treatment of the mentally disabled since the early part of this
century, while tort law has stagnated in this regard. This Note argues that
when considering the negligence liability of the mentally disabled, courts
should not focus upon "geography" -that is, upon whether a defendant is
confined. Rather, courts should focus solely upon the nature of the
relationship between the parties, their knowledge and expectations, and
their relative abilities to prevent harm.4
This Note is divided into five Parts. Part I discusses how tort law has
traditionally held mentally disabled people to an objective "reasonable
person" standard for the torts they commit within the community.5 One
reason courts have given for imposing this liability is that it provides an
incentive for family members to confine their mentally disabled relatives, in
order to prevent harm to innocent strangers and to society as a whole.6 Part
II demonstrates that in the only four reported tort cases before 1991 to
address the mentally disabled in care relationships, courts failed to
recognize the importance of this unique relationship. This Part examines
why courts continued to hold mentally disabled persons liable for their
placements involving supervised living arrangements; to at-home care; to no care at all. This Note
regards only "total institutions" as confinement. Any other residential arrangements involving a
greater degree of integration should be understood as "the community." The cases that provide
the focus of this Note all involve "total institutions": nursing homes and facilities providing in-
patient care for the mentally disabled. For an analysis of "total institutions." see ERVING
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OItlER
INMATES (1961).
4. This should not be read to suggest that courts currently focus solely upon whether a
defendant is institutionalized. Courts do examine the parties' relationship in many cases.
Confinement is one factor among several that they consider. The primary argument of this Note is
that confinement as such should not be relevant at all.
5. See infra Part I. Courts have carved out an exception to imposing liability for the mentally
disabled where the disability has arisen suddenly and without warning. See, e.g., Breunig v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970). But see Bashi v. Wodarz, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 641 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a driver's sudden mental illness is no defense
to negligent driving). A second exception to the traditional rule is that in assessing contributory
negligence, courts often hold a mentally disabled plaintiff to a subjective standard. See, e.g.,
Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1900). See generally Note,
Contributory Negligence of Incompetents, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 215 (1964). Even this exception has
exceptions. See, e.g., Worthington v. Mencer, 11 So. 72, 73-74 (Ala. 1892) (finding that the
plaintiff's "dull mind" was no defense to contributory negligence). These two exceptions are
outside the scope of this Note.
6. See infra Subsection I.C.3 and cases cited therein.
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torts, even against a caregiver, and even when family members had taken
steps to obtain care for their mentally disabled relatives, either by placing
them in institutions or by hiring nurses to provide at-home care.' Coupled
with the small number of cases involving institutionalized defendants
before 1991, this fact may have led commentators to downplay the
importance of the logic of confinement as a rationale for imposing liability.
In a line of cases arising since 1991, however, the confinement
rationale has become increasingly important. Part III addresses a line of
cases creating a new exception to the duty owed by the mentally disabled.
In these cases, a caregiver has sued a mentally disabled defendant under his
or her care for negligent or intentional torts. In these cases, courts have
carved out a new exception to the general rule imposing liability upon the
mentally disabled.' Courts have uniformly held that a mentally incompetent
defendant living in an institution owes no duo' of care to a paid caregiver
because imposing liability would provide no further incentives to confine
the defendant. Some of these decisions have drawn the exception narrowly,
so that future courts might apply it only in cases in which defendants reside
in institutions. This focus on the logic of confinement, coupled with fact
patterns involving institutionalized defendants, rather than mentally
disabled defendants in home-care settings, reinforces the notion that the
mentally disabled should properly reside within institutions.
Part IV argues that the no-duty rule adopted in these post-1991 cases is
correct, but not because of the logic of confinement. A rule that focuses on
the care relationship, rather than on the defendant's geography, would
encourage a mentally disabled person to seek appropriate professional care,
rather than confinement that may not be appropriate. This Part suggests a
test for analyzing whether a duty of care should exist in a particular
relationship, Finally, Part V argues that a no-duty analysis supports
adopting a non-tort system to compensate injured caregivers. The no-duty
rule implicates a tension between the need to avoid a logic of confinement
and the desire to ensure compensation for injured caregivers. Such a system
is necessary to ensure that qualified caregivers-regardless of whether they
are employed by large state institutions or work as at-home nurses-
continue to provide care for the mentally disabled without fear that an
employment-related injury will go uncompensated. Such a system would
ensure that trained professionals continue to work on behalf of the mentally
disabled in the least restrictive environment, and that the mentally disabled
seek appropriate medical treatment without fear of exposing themselves to
tort liability.
7. See infra Part II and cases cited therein.
8. See infra Part IH and cases cited therein.
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I. TORT LAW AND THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE COMMUNITY
A. The Traditional Rule
American tort law has traditionally declared that mental disability is no
defense to negligent or intentional torts by holding the mentally disabled to
an objective, reasonable person standard.' Most scholars trace this rule back
to dicta in the English case of Weaver v. Ward,'° in which the court wrote:
"[I]f a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass: and therefore
no man shall be excused of a trespass ... except it may be judged utterly
without his fault." " In a second English case, Cross v. Andrews,'2 the court
upheld a suit against an innkeeper who failed to safeguard the property of
his guests: "And to say he is of non sane memory, it lieth not in him to
disable himself, no more than in debt upon an obligation." "3 Though some,
such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ardently supported this traditional rule
and its importation into American common law, 4 others criticized it for
effectively imposing liability without fault. 5
9. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961); Swift v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins.
Co., 700 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894),
rev'd, 52 N.E. 589 (N.Y. 1899); Schapiro v. Tchernowitz, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (Mun. Ct. 1934); In re Meyer's Guardianship, 261
N.W. 211, 214 (Wis. 1935). In contrast, Louisiana and other civil-law jurisdictions historically
have not held insane persons liable for their torts. See Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. Ct.
App. 1934); Robert M. Ague, Jr., The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 DICK. L.
REV. 211, 211 (1956).
10. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
11. Id.; see also Francis Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 9, 16 (1924) (explaining Weaver in greater depth).
12. 78 Eng. Rep. 863 (Q.B. 1598).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Boston, Little, Brown 1881) ("The
law.., takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which
make the internal character of a given act so different in different men."). Holmes also authored
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upholding a statute under the Due Process Clause that allowed
the sterilization of a mentally disabled woman. He wrote, "It is better for all the world, if instead
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility.
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. at 207. One
should bear in mind when reading the "neutral" pronouncements of Holmes's legal scholarship
that his attitudes toward the mentally disabled may have reflected this viewpoint.
15. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 103 (1908) (" [T]he early
common law ... [is] an instrument of injustice ... permitting unmeritorious or even culpable
plaintiffs to use the machinery of the court as a means of collecting money from blameless
defendants."); Bohlen, supra note 11, at 33 ("It is only where fault is essential to liability that
incapacity of such a person should logically relieve him."); W.G.H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in
Relation to Tort, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 333, 335 (1921) (criticizing the dictum in Weaver v. Ward
suggesting that mentally incompetent persons should be held liable for trespass as inconsistent
with the excuse of "utterly without his fault"); William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally
Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52, 65 (1960).
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B. The Evolution of the Restatement
The Restatement of Torts has evolved over time to reflect the traditional
rule. The first Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, implied that insane
persons had a defense to negligence actions: " Unless the actor is a child or
an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." 6 However, the American Law Institute created a tension in
its position in the caveat following the section, which stated: "The
Institution expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons are required
to conform to the standard of behavior which society demands of sane
persons for the protection of the interests of others." t7 An ambiguity
remained as to the proper standard for assessing behavior.
The Restatement (Second) resolved this ambiguity in favor of a rule
holding people with a mental disability to an objective, reasonable person
standard by deleting the earlier exception. The revised position stated:
"Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not
relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does not conform to the
standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances." ts By contrast, the
Restatement (Second) held those with physical disabilities to the limited
subjective standard of a "reasonable man under like disability." 9
Numerous twentieth-century scholars have criticized the prevailing
objective standard for holding mentally incompetent people liable without
fault in a tort regime that generally premises recovery on fault,'o for
unjustifiably drawing distinctions between mental and physical incapacity,"'
and for failing to make sufficiently detailed factual inquiries into the nature
of the defendant's mental incapacity.' The majority of scholars writing in
this area have recommended that courts adopt a subjective standard to
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (1934).
17. Id. at 744; see also William R. Casto, Comment, The Tort Liability of Insane Persons in
Negligence: A Critique, 39 TENN. L. REV. 705, 710 (1972) (commenting on the evolution of the
Restatement). This language was deleted in 1948, and the Restatement (Second) resolved the
ambiguity in favor of an objective standard, as noted above. See Casto. supra. at 711 n.40.
18. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
19. Id. § 283C.
20. See, e.g., Ames, supra note 15, at 103; Bohlen, supra note 11. at 33; Cook. supra note 15.
at 335; Curran, supra note 15, at 65.
21. See, e.g., Wm. B. Homblower, Insanity and the Law of Negligence. 5 COLUM. L REV.
278, 284 (1905) ("Thus, if a man be non compos mentis, it would seem that he should be no more
liable for negligence than if he were blind or paralyzed and thereby physically incapacitated from
doing or refraining from doing what an ordinarily prudent man should do or refrain from doing.");
Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Lau: A Limited Subjective Standard of
Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409,418 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Wm. Justus Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability. 17
ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 38, 57 (1944) (rejecting the courts' approach to insanity as "a blanket term
which covers almost anything needing a label").
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recognize unique factual distinctions among defendants and their
differential capacities to comprehend and control their actions.23
C. Policy Rationales Behind the Traditional Rule
In applying the traditional rule, courts have articulated several policy
reasons for holding mentally disabled defendants to an objective,
reasonable person standard. They have engaged in broad and policy-
oriented analysis, rather than detailed factual inquiries about the
defendants' mental disabilities. Though these underlying rationales are
interconnected, this Section addresses each one-compensation,
evidence/fakery, and confinement-in turn.
1. One of Two Innocents: The Compensation Rationale
Courts have held that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a
loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it." 24 This rationale
articulates a straightforward philosophy of compensation. If the tort regime
should properly focus on compensation, rather than blameworthiness, then
applying an objective standard might seem correct.25 Several scholars have
suggested that the imposition of liability upon a mentally disabled
defendant under these circumstances provides evidence that moral notions
of fault are not the underlying basis of the tort regime.26 But the
compensation rationale affects incentives to seek confinement. Holding
someone to an objective standard he cannot meet might force him out of the
community and away from contacts with others in order to prevent injury.
As one scholar has noted, "So where one is blind, unless we would drive
23. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 1I, at 32-33; Curran, supra note 15, at 65-66 (arguing in
favor of a greater factual understanding of mental illness rather than a social policy approach): f.
Ague, supra note 9, at 226-27 (recommending the creation of a "perpetual lunacy commission" to
evaluate competence in individual cases). Even Holmes recognized that in extreme circumstances
a mentally disabled person might be incapable of meeting an objective standard. He wrote:
There is no doubt that in many cases a man may be insane, and yet perfectly capable of
taking the precautions, and of being influenced by the motives, which the
circumstances demand. But if insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly
incapacitating the sufferer from complying with the rule which he has broken, good
sense would require it to be admitted as an excuse.
HOLMES, supra note 14, at 109. But cf. Homblower, supra note 21, at 297 (advocating a blanket
rejection of liability for non compos mentis defendants in negligence).
24. Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927); cf. Beals v. See. 10 Pa. 56, 61 (1848)
(containing the first reference to this principle in dictum in the context of an assumpsit case).
25. See Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. RtEv. 1. 12
(1927).
26. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151. 153 (1973)
(noting that the lack of an "insanity" defense to tort actions provides evidence that morality was
not the basis of the fault system); Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence. I J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972) (arguing against a moralistic view of negligence).
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blind men from all contacts with others, we cannot require him to act as
though he could see .... The blind or deaf man must use the streets if he is
to have a decent life .... -27 Courts have acknowledged that using an
objective standard for the mentally disabled may drive them from contacts
with others, just as such a standard would for the blind. But in contrast to
their concern that the blind man must be allowed to live in the community
to have a "decent life," courts relying upon the logic of compensation have
not shown the same concern for the mentally disabled. For the mentally
disabled, such segregation is positively encouraged.
The Kansas Supreme Court noted this connection between the
rationales of compensation and confinement:
If his mental disorder makes him dependent, and at the same time
prompts him to commit injuries, there seems to be no greater reason
for imposing upon the neighbors or the public one set of these
consequences, rather than the other; no more propriety or justice in
making others bear the losses resulting from his unreasoning fury,
when it is spent upon them or their property, than there would be in
calling upon them to pay the expense of his confinement in an
asylum, when his own estate is ample for the purpose.'
Commentators have criticized this "one of two innocents," or
compensation, rationale as nothing more than a statement of strict
liability,29 and have rejected it for perpetuating injustice." The
compensation rationale also does not reach outside the confines of the tort
system. It fails to reflect the possibility that a non-tort social insurance
regime could compensate victims for their injuries.
2. The Evidence/Fakery Rationale
Courts have articulated a second rationale in favor of an objective
standard, suggesting that such a rule avoids difficult evidentiary problems
in verifying the existence and extent of a person's mental disability.3'
Critics of this rationale have suggested that courts fail to take into account
27. Seavey, supra note 25, at 13-14. 27.
28. Seals, 254 P. at 349 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See sources cited supra note 15.
30. See Ames, supra note 15, at 99, 103.
31. See Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996): see also
German Mut. Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Meyer, 261 N.W. 211, 215 (Wis. 1935) (" ITIort-feasors shall not
simulate or pretend insanity to defend their wrongful acts causing damage to others ....- ).
1999]
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the stigma attached to raising a defense of mental disability, and that this
stigma reduces the incentive to fake mental disability.32
The evidence/fakery rationale takes into account the concern that, for
reasons of administrative feasibility, courts should not become entangled in
factually complex and subjective analyses of mental disability. Rejecting
the defense outright allows courts to avoid a costly and time-consuming
inquiry into an individual defendant's disability.33 However, this concern is
inconsistent with judicial analysis in contracts and criminal law in which
courts frequently engage in complex assessments of the mental states of
parties.34  Determinations of mental competence in "guardianship,
commitment, testamentary capacity, and numerous other areas call upon
triers of fact to decide whether an individual's mental condition warrants
[different treatment] . .. ." " Such determinations have proceeded without
undue strain on the courts. Concern about the difficulty of assessing this
evidence is overstated in light of the factual determinations courts make
even in tort law, as courts considering the contributory negligence of
mentally disabled plaintiffs tend to hold such plaintiffs to a subjective
standard.36
The evidence and confinement rationales are inherently interrelated as
well. Courts, however, have not always noted this relationship. Prior
confinement can constitute sufficient evidence of mental incapacity to allay
a court's concerns about whether a defendant is "faking it." 37 However, in
cases in which an institutionalized person has committed a tort outside the
institution against a stranger, courts have nevertheless held the defendant to
an objective standard.38
32. See Curran, supra note 15, at 65. While this stigma might not, on its own, be forceful
enough to prevent a dishonest defendant from faking mental disability in order to avoid liability, it
represents one countervailing interest that makes such pretense less likely.
33. See id. at 64.
34. See Hornblower, supra note 21, at 283.
35. James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
Ras. J. 1079, 1089 (1981).
36. See id. at 1090; cf Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232 (1900) (discussing
the contributory negligence of a child); Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, 190 F. 7 (9th Cir. 1911):
Note, supra note 5, at 215-16. Ellis suggests that a reason for the difference in the treatment of
mentally incompetent plaintiffs and defendants arises from differences of sympathy, rather than
any justifiable legal or policy analysis. See Ellis, supra note 35, at 1091-92.
37. Indeed, in several of the post-1991 cases, courts relied upon this rationale. See infra Part
Itl.
38. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961) (holding liable a schizophrenic
escapee from an institution, who had not been adjudged mentally incompetent, for negligently
driving a car and causing an accident).
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3. The Confinement Rationale, or the "Logic of Confinement"
While some commentators have suggested that the compensation and
evidence/fakery rationales motivate the use of an objective standard, this
Note argues that reliance upon a preference for confinement and
segregation of the mentally disabled-termed here the "logic of
confinement"-has begun to play an equally, if not more, important role.
Courts have articulated a logic of confinement by stating that "public
policy requires the enforcement of such liability in order that relatives of
the insane person shall be led to restrain him." 39 The American Law
Institute reflected a similar attitude in its comments following section 283B
of the Restatement (Second), which state that "if mental defectives are to
live in the world they should pay for the damage they do"'' and note that
"their liability will mean that those who have charge of them or their
estates will be stimulated to look after them, keep them in order, and see
that they do not do harm."'"
The desire to encourage individuals to confine their mentally disabled
relatives, and to force the mentally disabled to pay for the damage they
cause, suggests a belief that so-called "mental defectives" should properly
be segregated from the general community. One text stated explicitly:
"[A psychiatrist's] secondary function is to protect society from the
disturbances which are caused by the highly anti-social types of
mental disorder. This function is fulfilled by seeing that individuals
so afflicted are removed from society and placed in institutions
where their psychopathic behavior will not interfere with the lives
of others. It is a function similar to quarantining .... 4,
If they live in the community, the law must impose additional burdens upon
them.
Over the years, both judicial and societal opinions have reflected a fear
of the mentally disabled and a preference for their institutionalization. The
mentally disabled have been considered witches or associates of the devil. 3
39. Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 471 (Conn. 1988); see also Jolley v. Powell. 299 So. 2d
647, 648 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1974) ("[L~iability without subjective fault, under some
circumstances, is one price men pay for membership in society.").
40. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (1965).
41. Id. cmt. b(4); see also Casto, supra note 17, at 711 & n.43.
42. Green, supra note 1, at 271 (quoting STRECKER & EBAUGH. supra note 1. at 20).
43. See Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a 77terapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and
Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 805. 807 (1993): see also
Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 391-98 (1992) (suggesting that people
assume that the mentally ill are violent).
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Justice Marshall's concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center" recognized this legacy of negative attitudes:
[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy and tragic
history" ... of segregation and discrimination that can only be
called grotesque.... Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism,
the "science" of eugenics, and the extreme xenophobia of those
years, leading medical authorities began to portray the
"feebleminded" as a "menace to society and civilization...
responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social
problems." A regime of state-mandated segregation and
degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled,
and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive
custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for
life .... State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."
•.. Prejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined.45
Many states enacted compulsory sterilization laws for the mentally disabled
such as those upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell,4 and some
explicitly encouraged segregating people with disabilities, not only to
minimize the harm they posed to society but also to benefit the mentally
disabled themselves.47
The legal analysis underlying the logic of confinement flies in the face
of a strong professional consensus in favor of comprehensive community
treatment and integration into the least restrictive appropriate
environment.48 Such treatment would provide the disabled with dependable
income, community housing options (such as group homes, depending upon
44. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
45. Id. at 461-64 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and
footnotes omitted); see also GERALD N. GROB, FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL
HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN AMERICA 302 (1991) (noting that in the early nineteenth century,
"the mental hospital symbolized the means by which society fulfilled its moral and ethical
obligations to mentally ill persons requiring assistance").
46. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
47. See Brief Amici Curiae for the American Association on Mental Retardation, ct al.
Supporting Respondents at 9, Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) [hereinafter
AAMR Brief] (citing a 1914 article that advocated institutionalization as a benefit to the mentally
disabled); Robert Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY.
LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 266, 267-68 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985) (discussing one
goal of the Pennhurst State School and Hospital as to protect "'normal' society from the
depradations and dangers presented by these deviants," a goal that "almost displaced the more
therapeutically-oriented claims for such institutions..." ).
48. See M. Gregg Bloche & Francine Cournos, Mental Health Policy for the 1990s:
Tinkering in the Interstices, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 387, 402 (1990); see also AAMR
Brief, supra note 47; Brief Amici Curiae for ADAPT, National Council on Independent Living,
and TASH Supporting Respondents, Olmstead (No. 98-536); Brief Amici Curiae for the
American Psychiatric Association and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill Supporting
Respondents at 21-22, Olmstead (No. 98-536) [hereinafter APA Brief].
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patient needs), social and occupational services, and clinical services."'
While reliance upon confinement might have made sense when large state
institutions for the mentally disabled were the norm, as they were in the
early part of this century, such reliance is profoundly out of date after the
deinstitutionalization movement.50 The common-law legal analysis in tort
cases is also sharply at odds with current civil rights law. The legal climate
has changed over the last half-century, and now recognizes the importance
of integrating people with mental disabilities into the least restrictive
settings possible in such legislation as the Americans with Disabilities
Act.5'
This past term, the Supreme Court recognized in Olmstead v. LC.52 that
"[u]njustified isolation... is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability."53 This holding reflects the judgment that "confinement in an
institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, education advancement, and cultural enrichment." 4
Confinement involves discrimination because "[i]n order to receive needed
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those
disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy
given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental
disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar
sacrifice." 55  Olmstead brings into sharp focus the extraordinary
inconsistency between the law's clear preference, in the civil rights context,
for care in the least restrictive environment, and the reasoning in torts cases
favoring confinement. One commentator, writing after the
deinstitutionalization movement, rejected reliance upon a confinement
rationale as outdated, suggesting that "[n]ew statutes and case law have
transformed the areas of commitment, guardianship, confidentiality,
consent to treatment, and institutional conditions. .. " Tort law should
49. See Bloche & Coumos, supra note 48, at 402.
50. For an account of the deinstitutionalization movement and the transformation of modem
health care policy toward the mentally disabled over the last century, see GROB, supra note 45.
See also Burt, supra note 47, at 268-69 (discussing deinstitutionalization as a reform strategy in
the 1960s).
51. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (1994). and its implementing
regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998), which provides that a "public entity shall administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities."
52. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
53. Id. at2185.
54. Id. at2187.
55. Id.; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-7. 17.
Olmstead (No. 98-536).
56. Ellis, supra note 35, at 1079-80 (citations omitted). Despite his recognition that the
confinement rationale plays an important role in shaping the traditional rule for imposing liability
upon the mentally disabled, Ellis did not examine the doctrine in cases in which the mentally
disabled have been confined to determine whether, doctrinally or factually. confinement actually
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follow civil rights law in recognizing the full citizenship of the mentally
disabled. Courts must take into account contemporary medical and social
understandings, or else they risk perpetuating outdated stereotypes.
D. Questioning the Logic of Confinement
The confinement rationale is open to question from a number of angles.
First, as an empirical matter, it is difficult to determine whether the tort
system creates real incentives, particularly for those mentally disabled
people who cannot control their actions:
The assumption is that these people are aware of their legal rights
and liabilities, and will be consistently acting in respect to them.
Such is seldom the case with the laymen who rarely realize the
legal consequences of their own acts, to say nothing of expecting
them to control the acts of one who is unpredictable."
Related to this concern over the intensity of economic incentives is a
concern that mistaken understandings about the law may also distort
incentives. Because criminal law provides an insanity defense, some might
incorrectly assume that a similar doctrine applies in civil tort actions."8 This
mistaken assumption would provide a countervailing weight to the
incentives of the logic of confinement. Second, the confinement rationale
assumes that guardians have great control over a mentally disabled person's
acts, which may not be true.59 Third, mentally disabled patients are often
judgment-proof, relying solely on public assistance for their livelihood.' A
person with no funds to lose has little incentive to change his behavior,
given a rule that relies upon depriving him of nothing. Finally, it may be
unrealistic to rely solely upon tort incentives when other interests-such as
makes a difference. This Note examines the case law with close attention to the importance of
confinement in these cases. Ellis's analysis looked broadly at the question of subjective and
objective standards as appropriate for the mentally disabled, but did not look more closely at the
doctrine within to notice the importance of duty. In contrast, this Note's examination suggests that
courts must focus upon duties within the caregiver-patient relationship.
57. Ague, supra note 9, at 222.
58. See Casto, supra note 17, at 717.
59. See Ellis, supra note 35, at 1084-85. The confinement rationale relies upon an indirect
effect, rather than upon vicarious liability. It assumes that guardians or relatives will act in certain
ways based upon tort rules that affect their charges. One author rejects the indirect nature of the
confinement rationale, suggesting that a more efficient way of providing incentives to the family
would be to impose liability upon family members directly for the torts of their mentally disabled
relatives. He argues that courts should conform their judgments to support the "reasonable
expectations" of the victim. See David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Erpectations and Subjective
Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent.
50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 19-20 (1981).
60. See Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the
Mentally 11, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL' Y 67, 78-79 & nn.81-83 (1995).
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love, concern, the cost of care, embarrassment, fear, or revulsion-may
influence relevant parties' behavior more directly.6
A sole commentator suggests that an objective standard has a positive
impact on incentives for deinstitutionalization and community integration.
She suggests that an objective standard minimizes the burden of
deinstitutionalization on the community, fosters community acceptance of
the mentally ill, and encourages the mentally ill to become self-sufficient
members of the community.62 Her analysis does not consider, however,
whether in the caregiver relationship in particular, other forms of non-tort
compensation might encourage community acceptance of the mentally
disabled without placing unfair burdens upon individuals who may be
unable to conform to community standards.
Despite these concerns about whether the tort law creates real
incentives, there are two reasons to recognize and ultimately reject the logic
of confinement regardless of the rationale's economic impact. First, when
direct causal links to behavior are difficult to determine, the tort system
should remove even minor influences favoring the confinement of the
mentally disabled if confinement is more restrictive than necessary. Second,
the language and rhetoric of judicial decisions are extremely important for
what they reveal about the underlying attitudes of those in the legal
profession: advocates who make arguments based upon confinement and
judges who decide cases relying upon confinement. The mentally disabled
are full citizens and deserve equal concern and respect. The confinement
rationale should be rejected because it reveals an outdated attitude about the
mentally disabled, regardless of the rule's economic impact.'
The next Part examines the pre-1991 cases involving a patient-
caregiver relationship. This analysis will demonstrate courts' reluctance to
admit the importance of this relationship.
61. See Ellis, supra note 35, at 1085.
62. See Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93
YALE L.J. 153, 163-69 (1983). Ellis rejects this argument because it does not treat mentally
incompetent adults "like other adults," on the grounds that "mentally typical adults are not held
to a standard that they are definitionally incapable of meeting." Ellis, supra note 35, at 1108.
Goldstein rejects Splane's arguments on the grounds that deterrence is impossible for some
mentally ill or incompetent people who are unable to control their behavior, and that the rest of
society, regardless of the actions or living conditions of the mentally disabled. may choose to
avoid contact with them, regardless of subjective or objective standards. See Goldstein. supra note
60, at 88-89.
63. See Ellis, supra note 35, at 1085-86.
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II. TORT LAW AND THE MENTALLY DISABLED UNDER
CARE AND SUPERVISION
In a small number of cases arising before 1991, courts addressed
patient-caregiver liability in tort.' * In each of these cases, a caregiver sued a
mental patient alleging negligent or intentional torts for injuries arising out
of that relationship. In each case, the court rejected both an insanity/mental
disability defense and a defense based upon the relationship of the parties
(such as assumption of risk for negligence, or consent to injury for
intentional torts). The courts maintained the traditional rule that there is no
exception to liability for a mentally disabled defendant, despite the
existence of a care relationship between the parties. The first case
addressing the care relationship involved an at-home nurse rather than an
institutional setting. Thus, when other pre-1991 courts faced the fact pattern
of a mentally disabled defendant injuring a caregiver within an institutional
setting and looked to precedent, the rule was clear: There is no exception to
liability for mentally disabled defendants.
A. The Pre-1991 Cases
The first case to confront the issue of tort liability within a mental
patient-caregiver relationship was McGuire v. Almy, 65 in which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the defendant, an
"insane" person, was liable for assault and battery against her caregiver.6
The plaintiff, a trained, registered nurse, was employed to take care of the
defendant at the defendant's home.67 The nurse locked the patient in her
room except when they were together, having heard that she could at times
be violent and hostile.68 After the patient threatened to kill both the nurse
and a maid, the nurse entered the patient's room with the aim of preventing
injury.69 Upon her entry, the defendant struck her, causing grave injury.
In assessing whether the trial court ought to have directed a verdict for
the defendant on the grounds of the defendant's insanity, the court
examined past cases and summarized the traditional rule:
[C]ourts in this country almost invariably say in the broadest terms
that an insane person is liable for his torts. As a rule no distinction
64. According to extensive electronic searches, the four cases discussed in this Part are the
only reported cases arising before 1991 that address the question of whether a mentally disabled
defendant may be liable to her paid caregiver for either intentional or negligent torts.
65. 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937).
66. See id. at 763.
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is made between those torts which would ordinarily be classed as
intentional and those which would ordinarily be classed as
negligent, nor do the courts discuss the effect of different kinds of
insanity or of varying degrees of capacity as bearing upon the
ability of the defendant to understand the particular act in question
or to make a reasoned decision with respect to it, although it is
sometimes said that an insane person is not liable for torts requiring
malice of which he is incapable."
Recognizing that past decisions rested primarily upon policy grounds,
rather than detailed factual inquiries about either the defendant's capacity or
the nature of the relationship between the parties, the court ultimately
rejected a subjective standard for analyzing the defendant's conduct. But
the court failed to consider a no-duty rule that would place the caregiver
relationship outside the tort regime. The court finally recited several policy
reasons supporting the objective standard, beginning with the idea that a
"rule imposing liability tends to make more watchful those persons who
have charge of the defendant .... ,
Before engaging in a detailed factual inquiry as to what the plaintiff
might have known or consented to, the court voiced its support for the
policy reasons underlying the traditional rule, despite its awareness of
scholarly criticism. 72 Ultimately, the court held that the defendant was liable
for intentional torts to the extent that she was capable of and did in fact
entertain the necessary intent.73 The court stated in dicta that an objective
standard might be appropriate for assessing negligence liability.'
In examining the defense that the plaintiff had consented to the injury, a
defense that relied upon the relationship between the parties, the court
undertook a more in-depth factual analysis.75 The defendant argued against
liability "because the plaintiff, by undertaking to care for the defendant
with knowledge of the defendant's condition and by walking into the room
in spite of the defendant's threat under the circumstances shown, consented
to the injury, or, as the defendant puts it, assumed the risk, both
contractually and voluntarily." 
76
Ultimately, the court held that consent was no defense. It drew a
distinction between consent to care for a person and consent to injury:
70. Id. at 762.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 763 ("Fault is by no means at the present day a universal prerequisite to
liability, and the theory that it should be such has been obliged very recently to yield at several
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The plaintiff had assumed the duty of caring for the defendant. We
think that a reasonable attempt on her part to perform that duty
under the peculiar circumstances brought about by the defendant's
own act did not necessarily indicate a voluntary consent to be
injured. Consent does not always follow from the intentional
incurring of risk.77
In analyzing the consent-to-injury defense, the court found no evidence of
previous threat or attack. Nor did it find any "danger of actual physical
injury ... as a matter of law, plain and obvious up to the time when the
plaintiff entered the room on the occasion of the assault." 78 However, the
court never addressed whether the defendant was capable of performing her
duty under the circumstances. The above analysis suggests that the court's
ultimate concern was ensuring compensation for the victim. Though the
case established precedent on the caregiver-patient relationship, it did not
specifically address the issue of patient geography, as the defendant had not
been confined to an institution.79
In a second case involving the care relationship, Van Vooren v. Cook,s"
the defendant, who suffered depression after military service, was confined
to a mental institution." The plaintiff was not a trained nurse or caregiver,
but rather was responsible for waiting on patients at meals, making beds,
and cleaning floors. He had been informed that some patients, including the
defendant, were difficult and were at times locked up, and had been
specifically instructed not to enter Cook's room alone. 2 The plaintiff was
attacked violently when he disregarded this advice and went alone into
Cook's room to help him out of bed. The court imposed liability upon the
defendant for assault and battery, finding that the plaintiff had not
consented to the injury. The court recited the policy reasons behind the
traditional rule of imposing liability upon mentally disabled people for their
torts.8 3 Again, the court's recitation did not carefully assess or question the
confinement rationale.
77. Id.
78. Id. Seidelson suggests that in McGuire v. Almy, the court drew a distinction between the
plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's incompetence and the plaintiff's knowledge of the
defendant's "predilection to inflict personal injury." Seidelson, supra note 59, at 45 n. 106.
79. Subsequent cases involving the care relationship raised the issue of patient geography, but
courts did not find it sufficient to trump the traditional objective standard.
80. 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 1947).
81. See id. at 364.
82. See id.
83. The court stated:
[E]verybody is entitled to be protected against an invasion of his person, and, if the tort
is committed by an insane person, there is no reason why the person who is offended
against by the tort should stand a loss instead of the offending actor, and the liability
placed upon insane persons may be an incentive to those interested in the insane
person's person or property to guard against loss to society and the insane person.
Id. at 365.
[Vol. 109: 381
Rejecting the Logic of Confinement
As in McGuire, the defendant raised a consent-to-injury defense. The
court rejected it, first on the ground that no court in the state had recognized
a defense of "invitation" to assault, and second because "even though
consent were a defense, the physical attack must not exceed the consent." '
Here, the court found that the facts showed no consent as a matter of law, as
the plaintiff entered the defendant's room to summon him to dinner and was
at the time unaware of the defendant's irritability.5 The court drew a
distinction between a defendant's general propensity to violence and actual
irritability immediately preceding the injury. The latter suggested a greater
likelihood of actual injury, and was more important in the court's analysis.
However, two justices dissented, suggesting for the first time that both
the plaintiff's factual knowledge at the time of injury and the nature of the
relationship between the parties might relieve the defendant of liability. The
dissent noted, "While there can be no question of the rule that a lunatic is
as responsible for assault and battery as a sane person, nevertheless, there
can be no assault and battery where one voluntarily engages in an encounter
in which that may inevitably result." ' The dissent also questioned whether
the underlying policy reasons for imposing liability in fact applied, given
the defendant's confinement:
Since one of the main reasons for imposing liability upon lunatics
for their torts is that such a course tends to make those who should
have an interest in the insane person, and so [are] possibly
interested in his property, watchful of him, certainly that basis is
not present here. It seems harsh to impose upon Cook confined in
an institution for the care of the insane the same rules of liability
for his torts as would be imposed upon Cook allowed, unattended,
to roam the streets.87
The dissent envisioned the proper place for the mentally ill in institutions,
and would have created an exception in keeping with the logic of
confinement. The dissent's focus upon the relationship between the parties
has been cited with approval in cases arising after 1991.
In a second case involving an institutionalized patient, Mullen v.
Bruce,88 the California District Court of Appeal held that an alcoholic
patient who suffered from delirium and resided in a sanitarium could be
held liable for both assault and negligence against her nurse. The defendant
asserted the defenses of assumption of risk and implied consent to injury.
The plaintiff had been informed of the defendant's delirium and told that
84. Id. at 366.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 367 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. 335 P.2d 945 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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she was "violent and unmanageable" and "that she would probably have a
rough night with her." 89 The plaintiff had knowledge of both the
defendant's general condition and her state immediately preceding the
incident. The plaintiff was injured while restraining the defendant, who
knocked her to the floor.90
The court held that while the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the duty of
caring for the defendant, this did not amount to assuming the risk of injury
as a matter of law. Section 41 of the California Civil Code stated: "A
minor, or person of unsound mind, of whatever degree, is civilly liable for a
wrong done by him, but is not liable in exemplary damages unless at the
time of the act he was capable of knowing that it was wrongful."''
Interpreting this provision, the court upheld the traditional rule imposing
liability, including the lack of distinction between intentional and negligent
torts.9" The court's reluctance to uphold an assumption-of-risk defense
demonstrated its understanding that the employee may have entered the
employment contract without full autonomy.93 It also reasoned that she
might not have fully appreciated the risks of the position, as she had
attended to other potentially violent patients without incurring any injury.
The court did not mention the Van Vooren dissent's reasoning that when a
patient was confined, the policy reasons imposing liability might not apply.
The final pre-1991 case, Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,94 also rejected
a defense based upon the relationship of the parties in favor of imposing
liability. The plaintiff, a private-duty registered nurse, sued the defendant,
an alcoholic suffering delirium under the plaintiff's care, for assault and
battery. The defendant asserted assumption of risk as a defense. The trial
court allowed instruction on assumption of risk, and the jury found for the
defendant. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that no instruction on
assumption of risk should have been given as a matter of law.9" The court
focused upon the contractual nature of the relationship.96 As the nurse was
an independent contractor, her contract required her to "employ the skill,
knowledge and care commonly possessed and exercised by members of the
profession ... according to the circumstances of the case." 97 Ultimately, the
court concluded that assumption of risk could be a defense to this injury
only "if by the exercise of due care she should have prevented the injury, or
89. Id. at 946.
90. See id.
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 41 (West 1982) (amended 1992).
92. See Mullen, 335 P.2d at 947.
93. See id. The court hypothesized that she may have risked losing her job altogether, had she
not accepted this particular assignment, and thus her actions may not have been completely
voluntary.
94. 417 P.2d 816 (Haw. 1966).
95. See id. at 823.
96. See id. at 821 n.2.
97. Id. at 821.
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if the hazard was one which it was not reasonable for her to accept in the
performance of her duty as a nurse."" s The court did not focus upon
incentives, nor did it recognize the role of non-tort compensation systems
such as workers' compensation in addressing the risks of "hazardous"
employment. In fact, while each pre-1991 case recognized the need for
compensation to the victim for the assault, no case mentioned the
possibility that compensation could or should be borne by a non-tort
regime.
B. Common Themes in the Pre-1991 Cases
The pre-1991 cases involving the tort liability of mentally disabled
defendants shared a number of key themes. First, patient geography did not
matter very much, despite the oft-recited pronouncement that a tort rule
should give incentives to confine a mentally incompetent defendant and
prevent harms against innocent strangers. The courts drew no distinction
between care at home and care within an institution. This suggests that
while early courts recited the confinement rationale, they did not take
seriously its implications in cases in which the family had taken steps to
confine the defendant or prevent harm by hiring a caregiver. Though this
fact seems to be at odds with the renewed importance that the logic of
confinement has played in the post-1991 cases, discussed below, there is an
alternative explanation. Of these pre-1991 cases, only two involved
institutionalized defendants; the other two involved defendants in at-home
care under the supervision of a nurse. Only one of the four involved an
institutionalized defendant injuring a trained nurse. Thus these cases can be
factually distinguished from the post-1991 cases in which the defendants
were all confined in nursing homes or state psychiatric institutions, the
plaintiffs were almost all trained professional caregivers, and the mental
disability-either senile dementia from Alzheimer's disease or serious
psychotic tendencies 99 -may have been taken more seriously by courts than
the symptoms of detoxification or depression.
The second common theme is that in all cases the plaintiffs had at least
a general knowledge of the defendant's disposition to violence and, in some
cases, had knowledge of a violent outburst immediately preceding the
injury. Despite this knowledge, courts still rejected the defense of consent
to injury on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked specific intent to confront
the harm at the time of injury.
98. Id at 821-22; see also i. at 821-22 n.3 (citing cases holding that there can be a duty to
exercise due care in restraining an insane person from inflicting injury). The court also made clear
that it would not allow a defense of contributory negligence to assault and battery to creep in
under the guise of assumption of risk. See id. at 822.
99. See infra Part III and cases cited therein.
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Third, courts' policy analyses did not explore beyond the narrow
confines of the tort regime. When the primary goal was to compensate
victims for their injuries, each court looked only to the defendant and did
not recognize the potential contribution of social insurance mechanisms
such as workers' compensation or other non-tort systems."° Nor did courts
recognize the potential negative incentives that imposing liability in the
caregiver relationship might have had on the decision to hire a caregiver,
especially if a mere warning was not sufficient to insulate the mentally
incompetent person from liability.
III. RECENT DOCTRINAL CHANGES
In a line of cases arising since 1991, courts have begun to carve out an
exception to the general rule imposing liability on the mentally disabled. In
each case, a caregiver has sued a mentally disabled patient for injuries
arising out of the care relationship.' ° The courts have uniformly held that a
mentally incompetent patient owes no duty of care to refrain from
negligence to a paid caregiver, because within that relationship, and within
the confines of an institution, the policy reasons in favor of imposing
liability do not apply. The irony of these decisions is that rather than
overturning the traditional rule to implement a subjective standard for
mentally incompetent defendants regardless of where they live, the courts
have provided greater support for the notion that mentally disabled people
should be segregated from society. By creating a narrow exception rather
than supplanting the rule, these decisions are consistent with and reinforce a
paradigm of separation.
Juxtaposing the pre- and post-1991 cases demonstrates the shift in how
courts have treated this particular relationship. A close examination of the
post-1991 cases suggests that what underlies the new exception is a new
focus upon the issue of duty and the relationship between the parties, as
well as a residual, unexamined belief that mentally disabled individuals
should properly reside outside the community.
100. In all fairness to these courts, workers' compensation may not have covered at-home
caregivers, and other non-tort mechanisms, such as those suggested infra Part V, did not exist.
101. The cases cited herein are the only reported cases addressing this particular fact pattern
and the legal question of what duty a mentally disabled person owes her paid caregiver for
negligence. Search of Westlaw, ALLCASES-OLD and ALLCASES databases (Sept. I, 1999).
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A. The Post-1991 Cases'0 2
The first case to create an exception to the rule governing the caregiver
relationship, Anicet v. Gant,10 3 involved a violently insane resident of the
South Florida State Hospital who was involuntarily committed. Within the
hospital, the defendant resided in the ward designed for the lowest-
functioning patients."° At the time of the incident, he was locked in a day
room. The plaintiff, a unit treatment specialist who was specifically
responsible for treating and restraining the defendant, was aware of
Anicet's propensity for violence.'0 5 After the defendant threatened another
patient, the plaintiff entered Anicet's room and Anicet threw an ashtray at
him. The plaintiff sued for assault and battery.
The court held that, while as a general rule insane persons are liable
both for intentional torts and for negligence on public policy grounds,"°
courts should not impose liability when the rationales behind the rule do not
apply. The court wrote, "[W]e revert to the basic rule that where there is no
fault, there should be no liability." 107 Yet this statement is inaccurate,
102. Because of space constraints, this analysis excludes Colnan v. Notre Dante
Convalescent Home, 968 F. Supp. 809 (D. Conn. 1997). which held that an institutionalized
Alzheimer's patient owes no duty of care to a paid caregiver to refrain from negligence. but may
be held liable for intentional torts; and Muniz v. Vhtite, 979 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1998). cert.
granted, (Colo. June 28, 1999), which held an institutionalized Alzheimer's patient liable for
assault and battery against an employee of a facility providing care when the defense did not raise
the issue of the plaintiff's status as caregiver. In addition, though it is outside the scope of this
Note, the fact that the defendants in these cases are overwhelmingly Alzheimer's patients may
have had an impact on judges' willingness to apply the logic of confinement. It may be socially
acceptable to see nursing homes as therapeutic institutions for the elderly and to apply what seems
to be a forgiving rule of liability in such cases, without considering how future courts considering
defendants with other kinds of mental disability might build upon that precedent. One case in this
line, Creasy v. Rusk, 696 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), uniquely held that the question of duty
owed by a mentally disabled defendant to a caregiver is a mixed one of law and fact. However.
this opinion was later transferred and vacated. See Creasy v. Rusk. 714 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. 1999).
103. 580 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991).
104. See id. at 274.
105. See id
106. In addressing the fact that the court refers to "intentional" torts and "negligent" ones.
Judge Schwartz qualified the words in quotation marks with the following caveat: "[Als the
authorities uniformly recognize, it is impossible to ascribe either the volition implicit in an
intentional tort, the departure from the standard of a 'reasonable' person which defines an act of
ordinary negligence, or indeed any concept of 'fault' at all to one who. like Anicet. is by
definition unable to control his own actions through any exercise of reason." Id. at 275 (citing
cases). Despite recognizing this fact, the court did not seek to overturn the general rule imposing
liability without fault.
107. Id. at 277. One author discusses Anicet alongside Breunig r. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970), as exemplifying a major exception to the reasonable
person standard in negligence actions: that of sudden unforeseen illness. Her overall argument is
that a subjective standard of liability ought to be imposed upon those mentally ill people who
cannot avoid the harm they cause because their disease is sudden or untreatable. She suggests that
both Breunig and Anicet provide support for overtuming the objective standard. With regard to
Anicet, she writes that "the court's reasoning is equally persuasive in all negligence cases where
the plaintiff could not ex ante prevent the harm caused due to mental illness." Goldstein. supra
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because the court did not reject the traditional rule to impose a subjective
standard, as commentators had hoped. Instead, it created a narrow
exception under limited circumstances, an exception which reinforced the
policies behind the rule itself. The court's actual holding relied upon the
presence of three crucial factors. First, the court reasoned that the plaintiff
was not wholly innocent, as he was aware of violent action immediately
preceding the injury. Second, the court found Anicet "entirely blameless"
as he had "no control over his actions and [was] thus innocent of any
wrongdoing in the most basic sense of that term." 108 Finally, the court noted
the existence of workers' compensation.' °9 Ultimately, the court found no
duty:
We emphasize that we deliberately do not put the doctrine of this
case in terms of 'assumption of risk,' in the sense of that principle
which refers to conduct of the plaintiff which bars reliance upon an
otherwise existing tort.... Rather we conclude that no duty to
refrain from violent conduct arises on the part of a person who has
no capacity to control it to one who is specifically employed to do
just that.'
The court did not place all of its emphasis upon confinement; another
crucial variable here was incapacity to control one's behavior. Confinement
provided convenient evidence of that incapacity. At one point in the
opinion, in discussing the "two innocents" rationale, the court mentioned
Kaczer v. Marrero,"' which, according to the Anicet court, "upheld the
right of an innocent workman to recover from an unconfined insane person
who stabbed him." 12 The reference to confinement is telling. Confinement
did not merely symbolize some fact about the defendant's capacity. The
court viewed confinement as crucial to determining what the plaintiff
expected and knew. Gant was an employee who was paid "to encounter,
and knowingly did encounter, just the dangers which injured him." , "
In addressing the confinement rationale directly, the court noted that
"Anicet, his relatives, and society did as much as they could do along these
lines by confining him in the most restricted area of a restricted institution
that could be found. Hence, it would serve no salutary purpose to impose
note 60, at 82. In contrast, this Note suggests that the proper mode of analysis is not at the level of
subjective or objective standards. Rather, a proper analysis ought to focus on whether the
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff given the particular circumstances of their relationship.
108. Anicet, 580 So. 2d at 277, 276.
109. See id. at 276.
110. Id. at 277.
111. 324 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
112. Anicet, 580 So. 2d at 275 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 276.
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the extra financial burden of a tort recovery." "' The decision rested also
upon analogies to the fireman's rule-that "as a member of society or as an
employer, one who has 'paid' another to encounter a particular danger
should not have to, so to speak, pay again for the very danger-even, as
bears repeating, if he has been guilty of fault in creating it." ,,5
The court rejected or distinguished Mullen," 6 Val, Vooren,'n 7 and
McGuire, cases that potentially contradicted its holding. The Anicet court
tellingly distinguished McGuire on the grounds that it "concerns a private
nurse hired to care for the lunatic in her home and thus directly raises the
'encouragement of further restriction' principle which is notably absent
from this case." "' Thus, the role of confinement, though not clearly at the
forefront of the court's holding, crept into its reasoning in subtle ways.
Anicet's holding is broader than subsequent courts have recognized.
The court's ultimate holding, that "no duty to refrain from violent conduct
arises on the part of a person who has no capacity to control it to one who is
specifically employed to do just that," "9 makes no specific mention of
confinement or institutionalization. Yet the court's method of
distinguishing McGuire and its discussion of the confinement rationale
suggest that geography matters. Anicet's treatment of this issue provided a
crucial toehold for later courts. Examination of later cases adopting this rule
demonstrates that courts have limited the holding to these facts-the
caregiver relationship within an institution-rather than suggesting that the
no-duty rule would apply more broadly to any caregiver relationship at all,
including one involving home care.
A subsequent Florida case, Mujica v. Turner,'20 addressed the rule only
briefly in one paragraph, but narrowed its holding to cover only persons
residing in institutions. In that case, the defendant's decedent resided in a
nursing home and suffered from an advanced stage of Alzheimer's disease.
The plaintiff was in charge of the "daily living activity program" at the
center.'21 Mujica was injured in the process of trying to prevent the
defendant's decedent from strangling herself with a bathrobe sash."n The
court rejected the plaintiff's negligence suit:
114. Id
115. Id
116. The court rejected Mullen on the grounds that the Mullen court was interpreting a
provision of the California Civil Code to which there was no Florida counterpart. See id. at 277.
117. The court rejected Van Vooren as a "three to two decision in which we think that the
dissenting opinion is by far the better reasoned." Id.
118. Id
119. Id
120. 582 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
121. Id. at 24.
122. See id
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[W]e conclude that as a matter of law the defendant's decedent, as
an institutionalized Alzheimer's patient, owed no duty of due care
to plaintiff who was the decedent's caretaker at the Greenbriar
Nursing Home. Although we agree that ordinarily a mental
incompetent is responsible for his own torts .... we have recently
held that this rule is inapplicable when the incompetent has been
institutionalized, as here, because of her mental incompetency and
injures one of her caretakers while in such [an] institution.' 23
Rather than discussing the case as a relationship between caregiver and
patient as the Anicet court had done, the Mujica court focused primarily on
the fact of institutionalization.
In Gould v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,1 4 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explicitly rejected a subjective standard for mentally
disabled persons in assessing their liability for negligence.Z5 Instead, the
court held that "an individual institutionalized, as here, with a mental
disability, and who does not have the capacity to control or appreciate his or
her conduct cannot be liable for injuries caused to caretakers who are
employed for financial compensation." i26 In this case, the defendant
suffered from advanced Alzheimer's disease, and his family admitted him
to a health care center, where Gould worked as head nurse of the dementia
unit. 27 The defendant injured Gould when she tried to direct him to his own
room and he pushed her to the floor.
Gould affirmed the traditional rule that a mentally incompetent person
should be held to a reasonable person standard, citing the Restatement
(Second) and Weaver v. Ward, and affirmed the public policy rationales
behind the rule despite the transition to a fault-based tort regime.'28 The
court recognized that limited exceptions to this rule exist, such as for
sudden mental incapacity. 29 Rather than overturning the traditional rule, or
questioning the continued relevance of the confinement rationale, the court
recognized that " [p]ublic policy considerations may preclude liability." 10
The court determined that Gould was aware of the defendant's health
status. By drawing an analogy to the firefighter's rule, the court found that
she was hardly an "innocent member of the public unable to anticipate or
safeguard against the harm when encountered. Rather, she was employed as
a caretaker specifically for dementia patients and knowingly encountered
123. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
124. 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996).
125. See id. at 283.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 284.
129. See id. at 285 (citing Breunig v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis.
1970)).
130. Gould, 543 N.W.2d at 286.
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the dangers associated with such employment." "'i Thus, the court did
address the relationship between the parties.
The court confronted the issue of confinement, but did not question
whether simple reliance upon the confinement rationale made sense:
[The defendant]'s relatives did everything they could to restrain
him when they placed him in a secured dementia unit of a restricted
health care center. When a mentally disabled person is placed in a
nursing home, long-term care facility, health care center, or similar
restrictive institution for the mentally disabled, those 'interested in
the estate' of that person are not likely in need of such further
inducement.'32
The court also addressed confinement as convenient evidence that the
defendant had not simulated mental disability over a period of years simply
to avoid negligence liability.'33
The court recognized that other courts, namely those in Mujica and
Anicet, "have rejected the common law rule within the limited context of
severely mentally disabled persons confined in institutions based on similar
public policy considerations." '3 Again, the court's treatment of the facts
and precedent overemphasized the importance of the confinement rationale
in precluding liability at the expense of a focus on the care relationship.
A California case, Herrle v. Estate of Marshall,35 is the broadest
holding of this line, but in some ways it is the most open to question. The
court held that the defendant, a patient suffering from Alzheimer's disease
and senile dementia who struck a certified nurse's aide, did not owe any
legal duty because of the relationship of the parties. In this case, the court
focused less upon the fact of confinement itself than upon economic policy,
the nature of the relationship, and a "cheapest cost avoider" '36 economic
approach-asking who would be in the best position to prevent injury. The
court feared imposing liability: "Were we to reach a contrary conclusion,
nurses working in an infectious disease unit could sue a patient for giving
them tuberculosis. Were that view to prevail, risks most efficiently
allocable to and traditionally borne by the health care industry would be
shifted to individual patients and their families." ' The court reasoned that
ultimate liability rests not with the patient but with the nurse's employer or
health-care facility for its failure to fulfill its duty to care for the defendant.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 287.
133. See id.
134. Id. at287 n.7.
135. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 713 (Ct. App. 1996).
136. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 244-46 (1970) (discussing
the "cheapest cost avoider" paradigm in the context of the employment relationship).
137. Herrle, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719.
The Yale Law Journal
The court noted, "The hospital assumed the primary duty to protect
defendant and those who might be harmed by her." 138 The court recognized
that workers' compensation covered the plaintiff, thus spreading the burden
of compensation.'39
The Herrle court only briefly mentioned the confinement rationale.
Institutionalization provided "strong evidence of the individual's mental
incompetency" '40 that obviated the need for extensive litigation on that
issue. The court also noted that the defendant, "through the agency of her
relatives, took steps to protect both herself and others from the very injury
suffered by plaintiff, by entering a convalescent home which cared for
persons who could not control their actions." "' Though the court
mentioned the convalescent home as a potential risk-bearer, the opinion's
language was sufficiently broad to recognize that families could take other
steps to absolve the mentally disabled of liability within certain
relationships. The case's ultimate holding looked beyond the fact of
confinement: "Because of the nature of the activity, caring for the mentally
infirm, and the relationship between the parties, patient and caregiver,
mentally incompetent patients should not owe a legal duty to protect
caregivers from injuries suffered in attending to them." '42
The Herrle court focused almost exclusively on the relationship, rather
than on geography. Subsequent courts could rely upon this rule to bring
home care within the ambit of the no-duty exception to liability for the
mentally disabled. If families hired an at-home nurse and an injury resulted
from that relationship, a court could rely upon Herrle as precedent to
relieve the defendant of liability within the care relationship, though the
defendant did not reside within an institution. Such broad applicability of
the court's holding and reasoning is compatible with the contemporary
notion that unnecessary segregation of the mentally disabled constitutes
discrimination. 4 3 A mentally disabled person ought not be required to enter
a mental institution in order to be relieved of liability to a paid caregiver
when at-home care is more appropriate under all the circumstances.
The Herrle court explicitly rejected the reasoning in the prior California
case of Mullen as outmoded and inapposite.'" While Mullen's secondary
assumption-of-risk analysis required factual inquiries about what the
plaintiff knew, Herrle's primary assumption-of-risk or duty-of-care analysis
focused on legal conclusions about a relationship: "[L]egal duties are not
discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in
138. Id.




143. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
144. See Herrle, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
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cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done." "'
The Herrle court found no body of case law that "stands for the proposition
that health care providers can sue their patients for injuries inherent in the
very condition for which treatment was sought" 14 even outside the context
of the mentally disabled. The court concluded with a cheapest-cost-avoider
approach, noting that "[i]t is the health care provider, not the patient, who
is in the best position to protect against the risks to the provider rooted in
the very reason for the treatment." 14' The patient should not pay twice: first
for the care itself, and second for insurance to cover the cost of injury
compensation.
However, the dissent in Herrle suggested that though the majority
properly focused on relationships, it mistook the relationship between the
two parties and made bad law, ultimately placing the most vulnerable
elderly citizens at risk. The plaintiff's main job was not to care for the
patient, but rather to change bedpans and help the elderly to their beds:
[S]he was not hired for the sole purpose of preventing potentially
violent Alzheimer's patients from injuring themselves and others.
Additionally, the mere fact that a family contracts with a private
convalescent hospital to care for an incompetent family member
should not bar every employee who may come into contact with the
patient, regardless of how remote the contact may be, from
recovering for injuries the patient may inflict.48
The dissent rightly focused on the relationship and on the nature of the
plaintiff's responsibilities. While an assumption-of-risk analysis would rest
upon a factual inquiry into what the plaintiff knew, the duty analysis
focuses more properly on the relationship between the parties. The Herrle
rule, though focusing on the relationship between the parties, may have
subconsciously relied upon the institutional setting of that relationship to
relieve the mentally disabled defendant of duty to a nurse's aide. It is
unclear whether the court would have found no duty had the injury taken
place outside the confines of an institution.
Of all the post-1991 confinement cases, Herrle most explicitly pointed
out the tension between a no-duty rule and a concern about fairness-that
caregivers should be compensated for their injuries. The California
Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief suggesting that the majority's
ultimate ruling would increase incentives to seclude and restrain patients
within institutions as health care providers sought to protect themselves and
145. Id. (quoting Christensen v. Superior Court. 820 P.2d 181. 190 (1991)).
146. Id at719.
147. Id.
148. Id at 722 (Wallin, J., dissenting).
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other patients. 4 9 This position ignores the extensive state and federal
regulations that prevent overuse of restraints within hospitals and nursing
homes. 50 For example, the implementing regulations of the Nursing Home
Quality Reform Act15' mandate that nursing home residents have "the right
to be free from any physical or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of
discipline or convenience, and not required to treat the resident's medical
symptoms." 152 Government-owned homes may be state actors for the
purpose of constitutional liability.'53 Penalties for violation of state and
federal regulations may include decertification, suspension or revocation of
the home's license, or civil monetary penalties.'54 Some states have
classified the inappropriate use of restraints as criminal "elder abuse" and
have provided stiff penalties. 155 At the same time, patients subjected to
unnecessary restraint may use the tort system to bring actions against health
care providers. 56 Despite these regulations, a rule finding no duty within
the care relationship must confront the challenge Herrle raised: to ensure
proper compensation for caregivers.
B. Common Themes in the Post-1991 Cases
The post-1991 cases share a number of common themes. First, they
primarily involve negligent, rather than intentional, torts. Doctrinally, the
courts analyze whether a duty of care exists between the parties, given the
nature of the relationship, the parties' relative capacities and expectations,
and (in some cases) the availability of workers' compensation. They do not
ask two crucial questions suggested by duty-of-care analysis in other
contexts: 157 whether the activity (of giving and receiving care) or the
149. See id. at 724.
150. See Marshall B. Kapp, Nursing Home Restraints and Legal Liability, 13 J. LEGAL MED.
1, 16-22 (1992); see also Elyn R. Saks, Note, The Use of Mechanical Restraints in Psychiatric
Hospitals, 95 YALE L.J. 1836, 1839-40 & n.19 (1986). But see id. at 1841-42 & n.25 (noting that
despite legal prohibitions on unnecessary restraint, hospitals do in fact restrain patients).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (1994).
152. 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(a) (1998).
153. See Kapp, supra note 150, at 16.
154. See id. at 17.
155. See id.
156. See Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of
Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 651 (1989-1990)
(advocating patient lawsuits to reduce the use of restraints).
157. The most comprehensive recent duty/no duty analysis for negligence has arisen in the
context of sports: whether a player owes a duty to refrain from negligence toward another player.
For example, a recent Connecticut Supreme Court case, Jaworski v. Kiernan,. 696 A.2d 332
(Conn. 1997), held that an amateur soccer player owes no duty to a teammate to refrain from
negligent conduct. Another athletic case, Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 704 & n.5. 708-12 (Cal.
1992) (en banc), held that one teammate cannot sue another teammate for negligence because no
duty of care exists to avoid negligence. See also Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) (same).
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relationship is one that courts should encourage, and whether the rule will
open the floodgates to litigation. Part IV addresses the importance of these
factors in this setting.
Second, the focus on duty of care allows courts to engage in broad
policy analysis. They examine the rationales supporting the traditional rule
of imposing liability (two innocents/compensation, evidence/fakery, and
confinement) and suggest that these reasons do not apply in cases where a
person has been confined to an institution. Following the reasoning in the
Van Vooren dissent, courts' policy analyses do not question the
assumptions underlying these policy rationales. No court asks whether the
tort system should create incentives to confine a mentally incompetent or
disabled person. The courts only ask which rule is proper when a defendant
is confined, given a policy favoring confinement.
Third, the holdings of these cases vary in their breadth. Some rely more
heavily upon the confinement rationale, while others focus on the
relationship between the parties. Holdings that focus on the relationship
between the parties could be interpreted to encompass the relationship
involved in at-home care, or care closer on the continuum to community
living. One goal of the tort system is to ensure compensation. A second is to
provide incentives for desirable behavior, such as encouraging the mentally
disabled to seek appropriate care relationships. In this particular fact setting,
the two goals are fundamentally interconnected. Sometimes they work at
cross purposes. If we recognize that much care can take place in community
placements or at home, a no-duty rule focusing on the care relationship
serves this end better than a no-duty rule relying upon a confinement
rationale. Courts should focus upon the importance of the relationship
between the parties, their expectations, and the availability of other forms
of non-tort compensation. While the results in these cases would be the
same, reasoning relying upon relationship and duty would suggest a
nuanced appreciation that confinement ought not to be the paradigm under
which the mentally disabled are assessed.
IV. A PROPER DuTY ANALYSIS
A. The Test
Courts are not questioning the logic of confinement as strenuously as
they should. By continuing to recite and analyze the public policy reasons
behind the traditional rule, courts have imported into modem reasoning an
outdated rationale that assumes a background norm of institutionalization.
When deciding cases involving mentally disabled defendants, courts ought
to be aware of the anachronistic assumptions that their analyses bring into
play. Countering this negative trend requires a new focus upon the duty of
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care and the relationship between the parties. This Part suggests an analysis
to assess the duty of care in a caregiver relationship. The test considers five
factors to determine whether a duty exists in a particular case. These factors
generally favor a no-duty rule for a mentally disabled defendant in a
caregiver relationship.
Several courts have articulated a test for determining the existence of a
duty to refrain from negligence in other cases primarily involving injured
team athletes.'58 A modified test, based upon this "fellow athlete" rule,
should be imported into assessing care relationships, because many of the
same considerations apply.'59 Assessing whether a duty of care exists in
negligence, courts have recognized the importance of several factors,
including: (1) the foreseeability of harm; (2) the "normal expectations of
participants" in the activity (such as the care relationship or a soccer game);
(3) the "public policy of encouraging continued vigorous participation" in
the activity or relationship while taking safety into account; and (4) the
need to avoid increased litigation."6° Finally, courts should consider (5)
whether there exist alternative mechanisms for compensating the injured
victim. One scholar notes that a no-duty rule "may also reflect the
judgment that the social values the tort system is meant to promote are
already being well served through other institutional arrangements" such
that a tort remedy is redundant.
161
Applied to the caregiver relationship, these factors tend to favor a no-
duty rule on the part of a mentally disabled defendant. The fifth factor, the
existence of alternative compensation mechanisms, is cross-cutting, and
permeates the discussion of the first four factors. Because compensation is
so important, this Note addresses it separately in Part V.
158. Analysis of a limited duty of care has arisen in two main contexts, according to one
exhaustive study: athletics and professional risk. See John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk After
Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717.
740, 742-43 (1991) ("In certain classes of activities, the courts do not want to impose liability for
risks inherent or frequently associated with those activities .... Limiting the defendant's duty
where the court determines there should be an enclave from liability ... avoids the risk that the
defendant will be held liable in a factual context where the courts want to protect the defendant
even when the plaintiff fails to appreciate a risk as required by assumption of risk.").
159. One post-1991 court used several of these factors from the athletic injury context. See
Colman v. Notre Dame Convalescent Home, 968 F. Supp. 809, 812-13 (D. Conn. 1997) (using an
analysis based upon Jaworski, 696 A.2d 332, to determine the duty to refrain from negligence
within a care relationship based upon the duty rule applied in athletic cases).
160. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 708-12; Jaworski, 696 A.2d at 336-37 (finding also
relevant to the determination of whether a duty exists what other jurisdictions have decided under
similar circumstances).
161. Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 846 (1997). This
argument provides the strongest support for the notion that the "two innocents" principle
requiring compensation of an innocent victim is no longer persuasive, at least not in the
employment context.
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B. Applying the Analysis to Caregiver Relationships
The above analysis supports recognizing that a mentally disabled
defendant owes no duty to avoid negligence within the caregiver
relationship. First, the harm is foreseeable. This factor might initially seem
to weigh in favor of imposing a duty upon the defendant, as foreseeability
of harm usually does. But the foreseeable harm-injury to self or others-is
precisely the reason for the mentally disabled person's entry into the care
relationship. Because this foreseeable harm is what the plaintiff is trained to
prevent, this factor cuts in the opposite direction-that is, in favor of a no-
duty rule. 6 1 Since the plaintiff is trained to confront the kind of behavior
that led to injury, it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who can adjust her
behavior more easily to address foreseeable harm." °
Second, a plaintiff's normal expectations most certainly include the
expectation of compensation for any injuries. A mentally disabled person in
such a relationship expects to receive appropriate care, not to be sued for
the type of conduct that led him to enter a caregiver relationship in the first
place. A no-duty rule need not frustrate either party's expectations; rather, it
would shift the burden of compensation away from the mentally disabled
defendant to a non-tort mechanism. As long as a compensation system
exists, this shift would not provide the wrong incentives to the mentally
disabled or to caregivers to avoid the care relationship for fear of liability or
injury, respectively. Currently, the workers' compensation system covers
some, but not all, caregivers. For covered workers, the expectations of
compensation will be satisfied, and thus this second factor is at least neutral
toward a no-duty rule. However, some caregivers, such as independent
contractors or at-home nurses, are not generally covered by workers'
compensation and would have their expectations of compensation
frustrated. This tension may be resolved through several non-tort
mechanisms, each of which is discussed in Part V, below. In the absence of
a functioning non-tort regime of compensation, the second factor raises a
tension.
Third, it is crucial to recognize the importance of encouraging
continued participation in the activity-the caregiver relationship. A rule
that imposes liability upon mentally disabled defendants who enter care
relationships can provide a disincentive to seek further care, especially
when lack of ability to control their actions may have been the reason for
seeking care in the first place. A rule that excuses liability solely upon the
grounds that a defendant is confined could create incentives to seek
confinement when it is more restrictive than necessary. The no-duty rule, in
162. See Cohnan, 968 F. Supp. at 813.
163. See id.
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contrast, which focuses on the relationship between the parties, can
encourage a mentally disabled person or her family to seek care in a less
restrictive environment than a "total institution," without fear that
inevitable accidents will result in large tort judgments. To find no duty
would simply shift the burden of compensation from the defendant to a
non-tort system.
Opponents of a no-duty approach argue that health care providers will
use greater restraints in order to prevent otherwise unavoidable accidents."
This fear is unfounded for two reasons. First, there exist other competing
regulations over the use of restraints in psychiatric relationships and within
facilities.'65 Second, as the next Part of this Note discusses in greater detail,
the modification or creation of alternative non-tort forms of insurance (such
as workers' compensation or other social insurance) could provide
alternative compensation.' 66 A no-duty rule would place the burden upon a
different regime to determine who must compensate whom.
Finally, a no-duty rule serves the need to decrease litigation. If courts
recognized a duty in this relationship, any caregiver trained to care for those
who cannot control their actions would be able to sue any patient for
injuries, even those resulting from the precise behavior that caused the
defendant to seek treatment in the first place. This factor created great
consternation for courts in the Anicet line of cases, and many found it
inappropriate to allow recovery under these circumstances.
67
The most important benefit of this analysis is that it does not depend
upon whether the defendant is confined in an institution. Within the
caregiver relationship, regardless of whether a mentally disabled person is
confined in an institution, courts ought to impose no duty of care.
V. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATION
One of the central challenges of a no-duty rule in the context of
caregiver relationships is ensuring that the plaintiff is compensated for her
loss when tort recovery is no longer available. As noted above in Part III,
courts have mentioned the importance of the workers' compensation system
as an alternative source of compensation in these cases. The logic proceeds
as follows: If the central goal of the tort regime is to compensate the
plaintiff for her injuries, an employee of an institution receives workers'
compensation regardless of her ability to collect a tort judgment from the
164. See supra text accompanying note 149.
165. See Kapp, supra note 150, at 16-22.
166. For a detailed examination of the workers' compensation system, see ORIN KRAMER &
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT
(1991).
167. See supra Part III.
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third party (here, the mentally disabled defendant).' 6 Thus a no-duty rule
does not completely foreclose the possibility of compensation.
An argument that relies upon workers' compensation, however, may
still reinforce the logic of confinement by affecting incentives for
caregivers and courts. Because workers' compensation is available only for
employees of institutions that are covered by the system, independent
contractors, such as at-home nurses, are not covered and will not be
compensated."6 Thus, if compensation is a crucial element in a caregiver's
decision to choose employment in a large institution or as an at-home
attendant, reliance upon the workers' compensation system may discourage
her from working in at-home settings. Courts in the post-1991 cases have
not recognized this problem, perhaps because none of the plaintiffs in the
cases arising after 1991 have been at-home caregivers.
Reliance upon the workers' compensation system may lead to a second
perverse incentive-this time for courts. If courts remain concerned with
compensating plaintiffs for their injuries, then the lack of available
compensation to at-home caregivers may lead courts to continue to impose
tort liability upon mentally disabled defendants in home-care situations,
while relieving of liability those mentally disabled defendants who reside in
large institutions where workers' compensation is available. Perverse
incentives both for caregivers and for courts remain consistent with a
continued logic of confinement. Several possible solutions exist.
The first potential solution would rely upon the so-called
"veterinarian's rule," which resolves the compensation problem through
contract. The rule holds that a veterinarian cannot recover in tort from the
owner of an animal that bites him, as the owner owes no duty of care to the
veterinarian to prevent conduct that is an inevitable "occupational
hazard." 70 This is true regardless of where the veterinarian treats the
168. See, e.g., Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
169. See, e.g., Stewart v. Carter Realty Co., 518 So. 2d 118, 119 (Ala. 1987) (recognizing
that Alabama workers' compensation applies only to the relationship " between the worker and his
employee' and not to independent contractors); Bowers v. Eastern Aluminum Corp., 214 A.2d
924, 925 (Md. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that an independent contractor is not an employee for
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act); Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. Fox Run
Farms, 600 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1993) (recognizing that independent contractors are not
employees covered by the Workers' Compensation Law). If at-home nurses are employees of a
larger organization, this concern may not apply.
170. Rosenbloom v. Hanour Corp., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 688 (C. App. 1998) (holding that a
shark owner owes no duty of care to a shark handler's assistant for injury that occurred -during
the course of treating an animal under his control, an activity for which he was employed and
compensated and one in which the risk of being attacked and bitten is well known" (citation
omitted)); Cohen v. McIntyre, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a dog
owner owes no duty of care to a veterinarian for a dog bite incurred during the veterinarian's
treatment of the dog on the grounds that "this is the classic situation where a defendant's ordinary
duty of care is negated due to the nature of the activity and the relationship of the defendant to the
plaintiff," and noting that the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff is irrelevant); Willenberg v.
Superior Court, 229 Cal. Rptr. 625, 626 (CL App. 1986) (holding that a veterinarian could not
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animal. Despite the extremely unfortunate analogy, one could argue that
because the two parties can contract for wages and other benefits, the
defendant should not have to pay the plaintiff twice for encountering a
known risk inherent in the profession or the project for which the caregiver
is specifically hired. While this solution seems superficially appealing, it
also seems unfair to impose these burdens upon the parties alone, given the
social benefit that results from encouraging care relationships and the
hardship to the individual parties of bearing additional burdens of
purchasing insurance. In addition, although diffuse market forces often
drive down the prices of private insurance costs, a private contract solution
may ignore market inefficiencies as well as power imbalances between the
parties in negotiating contract terms.' Finally, as the dissent in Herre
noted, caring for people is not comparable to caring for animals, especially
because a veterinarian might use restraints that would be unacceptable in
the context of caring for people.'
The second potential solution would build upon the existing workers'
compensation system, but would require legislative action to expand the
pool of workers who are covered to include at-home caregivers. This would
solve the perverse incentive problem that arises when a caregiver must
choose between employment at a large institution (with coverage) and an
at-home setting (without coverage). It would also address the incentive for
courts to distinguish between settings in which a plaintiff will be
compensated and those in which she will not.
This solution, however, also suffers from a major flaw. While the
availability of compensation for the plaintiff is important both to increase
fairness and to avoid perverse incentives, the source of the payment
matters. Workers' compensation currently places responsibility for
purchasing insurance upon the employer. Normal risk-spreading takes place
recover on the grounds that "a visit to the veterinarian's office can bring about unpredictable
behavior in a normally docile animal, and this is an inherent risk which every veterinarian
assumes"); Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a veterinarian is
barred from recovery against a dog owner when "[t]he risk of dog bites during treatment is a
specific known hazard endemic to the very occupation in which plaintiff voluntarily engaged."
but also noting that the plaintiff received workers' compensation); cf. Davis v. Gaschlcr, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 679, 683-84 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that where the plaintiff was an experienced breeder
and handler of dogs, but not employed by the dog owner of the dog who injured her, the defendant
dog owner owed a duty of care to the plaintiff). In these cases, it is important to note that the court
draws no distinction between the veterinarian and the assistant. Secondly, the courts rely upon the
relationship between the parties, following the logic of Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696. 707-08
(Cal. 1992) (en banc), rather than focusing upon the skills of the plaintiff, see Davis, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 684-85, or upon the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff about a particular animal. The
focus is more appropriately upon the nature of the relationship in a more objective sense.
171. For a more in-depth treatment of contract solutions, see Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance
Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 86-88 (1993).
172. See Herrle v. Estate of Marshall, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 722 n.2 (1996) (Wallin, J.,
dissenting).
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when an employer purchases insurance and then passes its costs on to
consumers. One assumes that consumers are not the potential defendants. In
contrast, in the case of the care relationship, the consumers of the
employment's "products" (the care services) are the mentally disabled
defendants. Though the employer-source compensation would not involve
the symbolism of a tort judgment, ultimately such a system would distribute
the risk to those who already shoulder the burdens of the cost of care.
Though not as strong a perverse incentive, the increased cost of care might
discourage entry into the care relationship or make it prohibitively
expensive.
A third solution, the solution this Note advocates most strongly, would
be to set up a system of public compensation through which the risk and
cost of insurance could be spread across the public as a whole. This logic
underlies the "firefighter's rule," which bars a firefighter from suing
members of the public who negligently start a fire that injures him. Courts
have noted that a no-duty rule prevents the public from paying twice: The
firefighter encounters known risks of employment and receives extra
compensation, disability benefits, and a pension to compensate for
encountering additional risk. This rule applies in several states to public
safety employees on the grounds that the public already pays taxes.7' The
analogy between the firefighting and caregiving is imperfect, in particular
when caregivers are private, rather than public, employees. However, the
fact that a public compensation system exists to protect against a risk that
could happen to anyone, 74 suggests that creating a similar system is one
possible way to address the problem of compensation within the care
relationship, even in the case of privately-employed caregivers.' 7' The
principles are similar in both cases: Courts support the firefighter's rule in
part because the tort system ought not to discourage the public from calling
firefighters for fear of exposing themselves to liability. By analogy, courts
should not let the tort system discourage people with mental disabilities
from seeking appropriate care relationships for fear of subjecting
themselves to large tort judgments. Society as a whole benefits from
173. See, e.g., Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. App. 1990); England v.
Tasker, 529 A.2d 938 (N.H. 1987); Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, 649 N.E.2d 1167
(N.Y. 1995); Maltman v. Saver, 530 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1975). But cf. Boyer v. Anchor Disposal,
638 A.2d 135 (NJ. 1994) (recognizing abrogation of the firefighter's rule by statute).
174. The particular defendants in these cases tend to be Alzheimer's patients. Perhaps the
public insurance scheme could insure against the risk that any member of the public could one day
suffer from senile dementia.
175. This distinction between public and private employees, if imported into the care context,
would run the risk of creating perverse incentives for caregivers to choose state employers rather
than private employers. Courts, too, might find no duty in state settings where plaintiffs would be
compensated, but might impose a duty in private settings where plaintiffs would not be
compensated. However, the fact that such a public fund to compensate injured workers exists is
enough to demonstrate that such a system could cover private, as well as public, safety employees.
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ensuring that mentally disabled individuals seek and receive appropriate
care.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that courts' continued and unquestioning reliance
upon the logic of confinement reflects an outmoded understanding of the
proper place of the mentally disabled in society. In order to avoid providing
the wrong incentives to confine the mentally disabled when this may not be
in an individual's best interest, courts should focus upon a duty-of-care
analysis that recognizes the special importance of the patient-caregiver
relationship. At the same time, a tension exists between a no-duty rule that
avoids the logic of confinement and the need to be fair to caregivers who
deserve compensation for their injuries. This Note has articulated several
possible solutions. Each is imperfect. But each attempts to ensure that all
parties seek appropriate care relationships-without relying upon a logic of
confinement. Tort law should not impose unnecessary burdens upon the
mentally disabled who seek appropriate and necessary care.
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